Agreement on strengthening the ceasefire

• Country/entity

  Armenia
  Azerbaijan
  Nagorno-Karabakh
  
• Region

  Europe and Eurasia
  Europe and Eurasia
  Europe and Eurasia
  
• Agreement name

  Agreement on strengthening the ceasefire
• Date

  4 Feb 1995
• Agreement status

  Multiparty signed/agreed
• Interim arrangement

  Yes
• Agreement/conflict level

  Interstate/intrastate conflict(s) ( Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (1991 - ) )
• Stage

  Ceasefire/related
• Conflict nature

  Government/territory
• Peace process

  Armenia-Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh: Process 1990s
• Parties

  M. MAMEDOV
  Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan
  
  Serge Sargsyan
  Minister of Defence of Armenia
  
  Samvel Babayan
  Commander of the Army of Nagorno Karabakh
• Third parties

  Vladimir Kazimirov
  on behalf of the Co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Conference
• Description

  This agreement details provisions to strengthen the Bishkek ceasefire regime. The agreement was drawn up as a series of letters: 1 sent out to the parties by the Russian mediator on behalf of the Minsk conference chairmen with the proposals for strengthening the ceasefire, followed by 3 identical reply letters from the parties confirming their acceptance of the terms of the agreement.

• Agreement document

  AM_AZ_950205_agreement on strenghening the ceasefire.pdf | Download PDF

Groups

Gender

State definition

Governance

Power sharing

Human rights and equality

Rights related issues

Rights institutions

Justice sector reform

Socio-economic reconstruction

Land, property and environment

Security sector

Transitional justice

Implementation

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC Mr. HEYDAR ALIYEV*

Dear Heydar Aliyevich,

According to the exchange of views on the issues of strengthening the ceasefire regime, which took place in Baku, I am sending to you, as it was agreed, the proposals of the Minsk Conference co-chairmen.

The proposals of the mediator on strengthening the ceasefire in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict

On behalf of the Co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Conference (hereinafter – the Mediator), with the purpose of strengthening the ceasefire regime established in the conflict region since May 12, 1994 and creating more favourable conditions for the progress of the peace process, we jointly suggest that the conflicting sides (hereinafter – the Sides) should assume the following obligations:

1. In the event of incidents threatening the ceasefire, to immediately inform the other Side (and in a copy – the Mediator) in written form by facsimile or by the PM line with an exact specification of the place, time and character of the incident and its consequences.

The other Side is informed that measures are being taken for non-admission of reciprocal actions which could lead to the aggravation of the incident.

Accordingly, the other Side is expected to take appropriate measures immediately.

If possible, proposals about taking urgent measures to overcome this incident as quickly as possible and restore the status quo ante are also reported.

2. Upon receiving such a notification from the other Side, to immediately check the facts and give a written response not later than within 6 hours (in a copy – to the Mediator).

3. The Sides agree that official sources will inform the mass media about the incident only after receiving the response from the other Side and if this response is delayed then not earlier than 7 hours after the transference of the initial address on a given issue to the other Side.

At the same time, the Sides will objectively reflect the response of the other Side in the report for the press as well as notify that contacts on a given issue are continuing.

4. With a view to establish a reliable direct urgent communication each Side allocates two PM devices and ensures 24-hour duty of responsible officials at both devices.

The corresponding numbers of the PM devices must be reported via the Mediator not later than February 6, 1995.

If it is impossible to use fax for sending urgent reports by the Sides to each other or to the Mediator corresponding texts are dictated by the PM communication line.

5. The Sides agree that the Mediator will take into consideration only those addresses of the Sides in which it is proved that a given issue has already been raised before the other Side.

6. In special cases the Sides may ask the Mediator to hold an urgent meeting with their representatives with a view to examine the incident and the formed situation.

7. If necessary, by the petition of one of the Sides and with the consent of the other Side a mixed group of inspectors including, if the Sides asks about it, representatives of the Mediator may be dispatched to investigate the situation on the spot.

8. Without waiting for the completion of the investigation of the incident the Sides are obliged to take measures to prevent the escalation with the purpose of restoring the status quo ante, at the same time maximally taking into consideration the possible recommendations of the Mediator.

9. Depending on the severity of the situation, it may be submitted by the Mediator for investigation at a meeting of the OSCE Minsk Group or at the OSCE Permanent Council.

10. The Sides are obliged to refrain from public statements that can lead to the escalation of the conflict.

We ask to confirm officially the readiness to assume the aforementioned obligations in full measure at the level of the top military leadership no later than on February 4, 1995 in order to consider, after receiving an appropriate response from the Sides, these obligations as effective beginning on February 6, 1995.

Vladimir Kazimirov

on behalf of the Co-chairmen

of the OSCE Minsk Conference

3 February, 1995

________________________________________

Attached:

The proposal on the text of the response.

The Co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Conference

To Ambassador V. N. Kazimirov To Ambassador A. Burner

I confirm the readiness of Azerbaijan to assume the obligations stated by you in your proposal of February 3, 1995 in full measure.

In case of receiving your confirmation about the general consent to these obligations, we will consider this agreement as effective beginning on February 6, 1995.

M. MAMEDOV

Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan

4 February, 1995

Note:

On the same day, February 3, 1995, similar letters were sent to President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan and leader of Nagorno Karabakh Robert Kocharyan.

On February 4, 1995, the same day when the letter of Mamedov was received, reply letters were received (identical with the one cited above) from Armenia’s Minister of Defence Serge Sargsyan and Commander of the Army of Nagorno Karabakh Samvel Babayan.