

**Country/entity** South Sudan

**Region** Africa (excl MENA)

**Agreement name** Declaration and Resolutions of the Chukudum Crisis Peace Conference

**Date** 20 Aug 2002

**Agreement status** Multiparty signed/agreed

**Interim arrangement** Yes

**Agreement/conflict level** Intrastate/local conflict

### **Sudan Conflicts (1955 - )**

Agreements relate to several distinct dyads, and also the negotiated independence of South Sudan, and subsequent internal conflict in South Sudan. Sudan-South Sudan. The long-standing conflict between the north and the south of the country dates back to colonial times, where the British introduced a so-called 'Southern Policy', severely hampering population movements between these big regions. Immediately after gaining independence in 1956, southern movements started to fight for independence; this fight became professionalised in 1983 with the foundation of the soon internationally supported Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). When the Islamic Front government introduced strict sharia laws in the south after it took over power in 1988 the war intensified. A decade later, the military situation reached a stalemate, enabling internationally facilitated peace negotiations to begin in 1997. After more fighting, a final negotiation push began in 2002, leading to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005.

Sudan-South Sudan post referendum. South Sudan became independent in July 2011; since then, relations between the two countries are complicated and violent conflict led by the SPLM (North) in the Sudanese Nuba mountains region has since intensified.

Darfur. Other long-standing violent conflicts are in the east and the west of the country. In the east, the Beja Congress, established in 1957, is the spearhead of a currently 'peaceful' opposition movement. In the west, the violent conflict in Darfur intensified in the early 2000s and rapidly gained international attention, even resulting in genocide charges against leading figures of the Sudanese government. The situation on the ground is complex, with over a dozen organisations (most notably the Sudanese Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement) fighting the Sudanese government and allied groups like the Janjaweed – although all parties have switched sides on numerous occasions. Several mediation attempts have not been successful, due to the shaky commitment of the Sudanese central government and the distrust among the armed opposition.

South Sudan - internal

In December 2013, after president Salva Kiir accused opposition leader Riek Machar of attempting a coup, violent conflict broke out between government forces of the SPLM/A and anti-governmental groups. In addition, several other political militias as well as communal militias have joined the conflict. In 2015 the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) was signed. Due to unsuccessful implementation the agreement was revitalized in 2018. In September 2019, Kiir and Machar agreed to establish a power-sharing government after struggles on forming a unity transitional government.

Close

Sudan Conflicts (1955 - )

**Stage** Framework/substantive - partial

**Conflict nature** Inter-group

<b>Peace process</b>	South Sudan: Pre-secession Local Peace Processes
<b>Parties</b>	Johnson Juma Okot SPLM/A Deputy Regional Secretary For Equatoria Region Signed: Chief Lino Atiolmoi Didinga Community
<b>Third parties</b>	Witness: Telar Deng Peace & Advocacy Coordinator New Sudan Council of Churches
<b>Description</b>	Agreement between the Didinga and the SPLM/A (mostly-Dinka) to resolve local tensions including discrimination against Didinga in the SPLM/A (and the issue of Cpt. Lokot. Resolutions touch on the removal of landmines, integration of local militia into the SPLM/A, implement the National Mobilization and Reconciliation Commission points listed, a halt on ambushes on the roads, professionalization of police and prison services, professionalization of check points, a roundup of small arms, and the implementation of a representative council to oversee implementation.

**Agreement document** [SS\\_020820\\_Chukudum Crisis Peace Conference .pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

### Local agreement properties

<b>Process type</b>	Formal structured process
<b>Rationale</b>	This agreement is part of a wider 'People-to-People process' facilitated by the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) that led to the signing of other accords prior to and after this agreement.
<b>Is there a documented link to a national peace process?</b>	No
<b>Link to national process: articulated rationale</b>	The agreement is not technically linked to the national process between the government in Khartoum and South Sudanese opposition forces, but it is part of a series of agreements resulting from the 1999 Wunlit peace conference that eventually helped to pave the way for a rapprochement between John Garang and Riek Machar's factions.
<b>Name of Locale</b>	Budi County and surrounding areas
<b>Nature of Locale</b>	Region
<b>GPS Lat/Long (DD)</b>	4.231335, 33.493195

**Participant type** Local state actor  
International or transnational actor  
Domestic religious organisation/leader or other elder  
Local community/civilian group(s)/civil society organisations  
Regional state actor

**Mediator, facilitator or similar** Mediator or similar referred to

**Mediator (references)** Convenor/facilitator: New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC); Telar Deng, Peace & Advocacy Coordinator, NSCC; Horn of Africa Centre for Democracy and Development (HACDAD); Facilitator: Wudrans (NGO)

**Type of mediator/facilitator/similar** Domestic religious organisation/leader or other elder Local community/civilian group(s)/civil society organisations

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### Local issues

**Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)** Page 1, A CONFERENCE OF RECONCILIATION AND HEALING BETWEEN THE DIDINGA PEOPLE AND THE SUDAN PEOPLES LIBERATION MOVEMENT/ARMY (SPLM/A) [...] Let us continue to pray hopefully that all good efforts at so many levels will in fact bring real peace to this troubled nation.

**Grievance List** Pages 5, RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CONFERENCE, ... While all of the conference recommendations are deemed critical in restoring confidence and trust, the delegates from Chukudum were particularly keen to see rapid progress in:

- i) the removal of mines,
- ii) the sensitive management of the Captain Lorot case,
- iii) the continued reorganization of personnel within the army (in terms of improving the ethnic mix of officers and transferring individuals associated with past controversies), and
- iv) the conditions necessary to attract back organizations to assist with needed humanitarian and development services in the area.

Page 9, RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CONFERENCE, 3.12 The conference calls upon the local authorities and other specialist agencies (such as NSCC and DOT) to urgently initiate a process of conflict resolution and peace building to address inter-communal and inter-ethnic conflict in the east bank sub-Region (such as cattle raiding).

**Cattle rustling/ banditry** Page 9, RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CONFERENCE, 3.12 The conference calls upon the local authorities and other specialist agencies (such as NSCC and DOT) to urgently initiate a process of conflict resolution and peace building to address inter-communal and inter-ethnic conflict in the east bank sub-Region (such as cattle raiding).

**Social cover** No specific mention.

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