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| Country/entity | Syria |
| Region | Middle East and North Africa |
| Agreement name | Deed of Agreement (between the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Operations Room of Aleppo) |
| Date | 19 Dec 2015 |
| Agreement status | Multiparty signed/agreed |
| Interim arrangement | Yes |

Agreement/conflict level Intrastate/local conflict

Syrian Conflicts (1948 -) (1976 - 2005) (2011 -)

The agreements relate to three different conflict contexts. Israel-Syria and Syria-Lebanon. The Syrian-Israeli conflict was a key factor for the Syrian intervention during the Lebanese Civil War, with Syrian-backed Palestinian Liberation Army units intervened in 1976 against the Palestinian/Leftist militias. Following a massacre at Tel al-Zaatar that year, Syria was forced to accept a ceasefire at a meeting of the Arab League. However, the Arab League also mandated an Arab Deterrence Force, consisting of mostly Syrian soldiers with token contributions from other Arab League states, thus further legitimizing the Syrian presence in Lebanon. During a second bout of fighting that began in 1989, caused by the formation of rival Lebanese regimes in East and West Beirut, the Syrian-backed regime won and in 1991 the 'Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination' was signed to legalize the Syrian occupation as a means to ensure the security of Syria. Syrian forces were forced to withdraw in 2005 following possible involvement in the assassination of Lebanon's President Hariri.

Syria-internal. In 2011, domestic upheaval following a wave of protests across the Arab World soon led to violent repression of protestors by Syrian government troops. The violence progressed steadily and by July 2011 the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed consisting of defected military units and new recruits. The FSA and rebel umbrella group known as the Syrian National Council represented the first attempt at coordinating rebel factions in late 2011. However, a steady influx of foreign fighters and increased sectarianism radicalised opposition groups, which relied on foreign funding. The nature of the conflict changed drastically in late 2013 as infighting among the opposition groups increased. One of the more significant developments was the split between the al-Qaeda outfits the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, ISIS), and Jabhat al-Nusra in early 2014 in addition to the intensified targeting of other rebel factions by ISIS fighters in particular, including the Kurdish Peshmerga, the FSA and other jihadist outfits. Since the summer of 2014, the conflict was further internationalized when ISIS announced the formation of an Islamic state eroding the state line between Iraq and Syria and also in mid-2015 when Russian forces intervened on behalf of the Bashar al-Assad government in Damascus.

Close
Syrian Conflicts (1948 -) (1976 - 2005) (2011 -)

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|------------------------|---|
| Stage | Ceasefire/related |
| Conflict nature | Inter-group |
| Peace process | Syrian Local Agreements |
| Parties | People's Protection Units (YPG); Operations Room of Aleppo |

Third parties

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Description

Short ceasefire agreement between the non-state actors, the People's Protection Units and the Operations Room of Aleppo, including access and mobility provisions and shared sovereignty of areas.

Agreement document

[SY_151219_Instrument of Agreement between YPG and FOR, Aleppo_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

Agreement document (original language)

[SY_151219_Instrument of Agreement between YPG and FOR, Aleppo_AR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

Local agreement properties

Process type Informal but persistent process

Rationale -> Link to national level; no external support mechanism; culture of signing There is no formally established mechanism to support the negotiation between Salafi armed groups. Moreover, this agreement cannot be linked to the national peace process. Indeed, both groups oppose the rule of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and reject the idea of a national negotiation to solve the conflict. Yet, it seems that both signing parties choose to solve the conflicts related to their armed struggle through agreements (see references). Although one cannot speak of a "culture" of signing peace agreements, the parties are involved (in a non-proactive and non-conscious way) in a persistent practice of signing local agreements.

Is there a documented link to a national peace process? No

Link to national process: articulated rationale No link to the national peace process in Syria is mentioned in the agreement, neither it can be inferred from further research. First, the agreement does not involve local governance actors; and the signing parties themselves are not official state representative. Second, all parties to the agreement reject the national peace process, as it would maintain Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government in power. The agreement is a "In response to the initiative of the Shura and Reconciliation Council in Aleppo between the two parties."

Name of Locale Afrin, Sheikh Maqsoud

Nature of Locale Region

GPS Lat/Long (DD) 36.508416, 36.866926

Participant type Local armed group

Mediator, facilitator or similar No mention of mediator or similar

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture) Page 1, God is the Conciliator.

Grievance List Although the agreement does not refer to specific causes of the conflict, it lists seven provisions to address local grievances.

Page 1,

1. A mutual ceasefire between the two parties.
2. The crossing of civilians to and from Sheikh Maqsoud to Afrin through the safe areas and checkpoints under the control of the Fatah Operations Room of Aleppo in the context of prior coordination.
3. Closure of the crossing in the Sheikh Maqsoud area linking to areas under the control of the [Syrian] regime. A joint committee between the parties [Fatah Operations Room of Aleppo and the People's Protection Units] will monitor the closure.
4. The opening of crossings leading to Afrin.
5. Factions of the Operations Room that liberated Aleppo may access Eastern Sheikh Maqsoud in accordance with the Rebel Army¹ and the People's Protection Units.
6. Possession of Sheikh Maqsoud is shared between the two sides.
7. Form a military commission consisting of both parties to implement this agreement and investigate locations for approval or rejection.

Cattle rustling/ banditry No specific mention.

Social cover No specific mention.
