

Country/entity	Yemen
Region	Middle East and North Africa
Agreement name	Ajmar Agreement
Date	4 Feb 2014
Agreement status	Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement	Yes

Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 -)

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

Stage	Ceasefire/related
Conflict nature	Inter-group
Peace process	Yemen Inter-group Agreements
Parties	Signed by the two parties in the Ajmar Nayābita area by Sheikhs of Bani Sarīm Hāshid including Sheikh Ālī Hamīd Jalaydān, Sheikh ‘Adel Hamūd ‘Ataf and other elders, in addition to Ansar Allah representatives and in the presence of dignitaries of Hamdān municipality.
Third parties	-
Description	Short agreement negotiating an end to tensions between Ansar Allah and the Bani Sarim Tribe in Amran. Ansar Allah commit to not undertake military operations in the areas of the Bani Sarim, meanwhile, the Bani Sarim must secure the roads, not prevent of object to the activities of Ansar Allah. The authenticity of the agreement was originally disputed by one of the signatories, Sheikh Ali Jalaydan. However, in later interviews with Shiekh Amin al-Ataf, the Shiekh confirmed the existence of the Ajmar Agreement, which was broken by Ansar Allah quickly after signing.

Agreement document [YE_140204_Ajmar Agreement_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

Agreement document (original language) [YE_140204_Ajmar Agreement_AR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

Local agreement properties

Process type Informal but persistent process

Rationale There is a clear expression of mutual respect for cultural values and religious expression in this agreement which is prevalent in local agreements. There are also provisions which outline the requirement for sheikhs and elders to ensure the implementation of the agreement which tends to be a commonly accepted local practice. Furthermore, societal notables or 'dignitaries' from Hamdān district, which is in the Sana'a governorate, are described as being present at the signing. This should be considered as a form of witnessing but not mediation.

Is there a documented link to a national peace process? No

Link to national process: articulated rationale There is no clear reference in the text to the national process and no further apparent structural links based on further research.

Name of Locale Bani Sarim, 'Amran governorate
Nature of Locale Region
GPS Lat/Long (DD) 15.664332, 43.933941
Participant type Local armed group
Mediator, facilitator or similar No mention of mediator or similar

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture) Page 1, Untitled Preamble: In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Page 1, Fifth: The sheikhs and elders of Bani Sarīm commit not to attack those that join the Quranic Rally in their country, or their children, and will have faith in itself, its land and its wealth.
Page 1, Allah is the Conciliator

Grievance List [Summary] (1) For the two parties to be able to live and co-exist in peace, with no objection to the peaceful cultural expressions or activities of Ansar Allah or any other group in the area (2) No further acts of military aggression from Ansar Allah in the areas that the agreement prescribes for (3) Roads must be secured by elders and sheikhs (4) Those who choose to join the Quranic cause in the country must not be attacked by the sheikhs or elders of the area

Cattle rustling/ banditry No specific mention.

Social cover No specific mention.
