Agreement to Solve the Problem regarding al-Ma'ashiq Palace

• Country/entity

  Yemen
  
• Region

  Middle East and North Africa
  
• Agreement name

  Agreement to Solve the Problem regarding al-Ma'ashiq Palace
• Date

  29 Feb 2016
• Agreement status

  Multiparty signed/agreed
• Interim arrangement

  Yes
• Agreement/conflict level

  Intrastate/local conflict ( Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - ) )
• Stage

  Pre-negotiation/process
• Conflict nature

  Government/territory
• Peace process

  Yemen Inter-group Agreements
• Parties

  Southern Resistance in Krater;
  al-Maʿāshīq guards
• Third parties

  -
• Description

  Short agreement on the transfer of checkpoints to the Southern Resistance from the al-Ma'ashiq Guards (al-Ma'ashiq) is the Presidential Palace in Aden. Other provisions include adding martyrs to the list of martyrs in Aden; evacuate the wounded; assign a committee to follow up on the wounded; integrate the Southern Resistance into the Army; pay the al-Ma'ashiq Guards; to begin the work of those troops trained in Saudi Arabia.

• Agreement document

  YE_160229_Agreement to Solve the Problem regarding al-Ma'shiq Palace_EN.pdf | Download PDF

Local agreement properties

• Process type

  Formal structured process
  
• Rationale

  This agreement take place early in 2016 and generally fits with some of the procedural practices that begin to work themselves into agreements at both national and local level throughout April. This agreement echoes a recognition of practices around the handover or exchange of checkpoints or military spaces. There is also clear repetition in the forming of a local committee to follow up on and implement or monitor a specific focus within the provisions of the agreement(evacuation and welfare of the wounded), which similarly appears to be a universal standard in the country. By the party representation, this also appears to reflect a confidence among local actors in the capacity of groups to lead the delivery of provisions. This agreement conveys a sense of autonomous resolution to it. Particularly as a government affiliated guard are one of the parties, there does not seem to be too much involvement from other actors in terms of brokerage / leverage.
• Is there a documented link to a national peace process?

  Yes
• Link to national process: articulated rationale

  As a complex conflict, a link to the national process is being inferred by the involvement of the palace guards as a signing party. It is possible to consider them as a local governance actor with a clear stance towards the wider conflict. Further, in terms of the link to the national process, the city of Aden at this time is still supposed to be held by the government and officially it is, however this agreement comes after a sustained period of fighting in the city involving a number of militia groups pushing for real control in what is an increasingly fractured key southern city. Part of the provisions of the national process and the NDC were originally to slowly reduce the influence and control of militia groups in Sana'a and other key cities. This factor makes this agreement around the presidential palace fairly important in regard to that context. Further, part of controlling cities like Aden in the south is key to the wider national process aims of the government. There is further connection to the national level in the sense that the agreement follows a period whereby the government struggled to pay the bills generated by its attempt to rebuild the national military. In the provisions of this agreement,the delivery of overdue salaries to one of the parties (the presidential guard) is described as necessary as soon as the agreement is delivered. There is also ambiguous reference to an outside group trained in Saudi Arabia coming in to 'begin their work' at the beginning of March, which further shows an outside influence from national level. It is very possible that this is in reference to attempting to make President Hadi's rule in the city more comprehensive rather than only official. At this time in security terms, while local militia and terrorist groups appear to be dominant, government control is reliant on coalition countries ensuring the national security agenda in the city. The party of guards should of course also be seen as affiliated with the central state and there is mention of official endorsement regarding the evacuation of the wounded, which likely refers to guards of the palace.
• Name of Locale

  Aden
• Nature Of Locale

  City
• GPS Lat/Long (DD)

  12.785706, 45.018624
• Participant type

  Central state actor
  Local armed group
  
• Mediator, facilitator or similar

  No mention of mediator or similar

Local issues

Points of Agreement to solve the problem of al-Maʿāshīq Palace in Aden

29 February 2016

1. Hand over two checkpoints at the Maʿāshīq gates to the Southern Resistance in Krater under the leadership of Mālik Hirhirah in which there are 40 men.

2. Obligate the Maʿāshīq Guards to grant 75 external rotations to the men of the Popular Resistance of Krater.

3. Evacuate the wounded by land or air, on the arrival of an official endorsement.

4. Add martyrs in the list of Martyrs of the Capital of Aden.

5. Assign a committee to follow up on the situation of the wounded at the Sābr and al-Naqīb Hospitals in Aden.

6. Integrate the Krater Popular Committee into the army and security as quickly as possible.

7. Deliver salaries to all the al-Maʿāshīq guards immediately upon receipt [of this document].

8. The last problem of the injured and their treatment will be undertaken in the Sābr and al- Naqīb Hospitals and the transferal of cases that require treatment abroad to [means of] travel.

9. To call on the group of people trained in Saudi Arabia to begin their work tomorrow, on Tuesday, 1 March.