Country/entity

Yemen

Region

Middle East and North Africa

Agreement name

Implementation Mechanism of the Ceasefire Agreement in the Governorate of Marib

Date

17 Apr 2016

Agreement status

Multiparty signed/agreed

Interim arrangement

Yes

Agreement/conflict level

Intrastate/local conflict

Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh’s General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah (‘reform’) party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People’s Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen’s traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen’s peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa’dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi’a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern ‘al-Hiraak’ movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana’a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year deadlock ensued until negotiations between the Houthis and the government of Yemen finally culminated in the Stockholm Agreement in December 2018. However, throughout 2019 the Saudi-led coalition continues to launch airstrikes. Furthermore, in May 2017 the Southern al-Hiraak movement had declared the secessionist formation of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), seizing the interim-capital Aden by January 2018. Territorial divisions between the Yemeni government, the Houthis, forces affiliated with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, local militias and tribes have continued to fracture the country.

Close

Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )

Stage

Ceasefire/related

Conflict nature

Government/territory

Peace process

Yemen peace process

Parties

Representatives of Government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi:
‘Abd Āllah ‘Alī al- Jimālī
Ra’id ‘Abd Āllah al- Thābatī
Nājī ‘Alī Manīf
Āhmad ‘Alī Rabī’
‘Abd al-Hakīm Rāshid al-Zūmhī
Muhammad Qāsim ‘Alwa
‘Abd Āllah Muhammad Kawīr
‘Abduh Hamid Shamalān
Mahmūd Sālih Haliyān
‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Alī ‘Āmur

Representatives of Ansar Allah and General People's Congress
Muhammad bin ‘Alī Ta’ymān
Sālim Hādī Raqīb
Sa’īd ‘Alī Salāmah
Sālih Sawda Ta’ymān
Sālih Yahya al-Suqāf
Khalid Sālih al-Āmīr
‘Abd Āllah Sālih al- Sharīf
Fāyaz Muhsin al- Suqāf

Third parties

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Description

Ceasefire in Ma'rib signed as part of the greater ceasefire arrangement signed in Dharan al-Janoub. Similar ceasefire signed in al-Dhalea. Agreement provides for a ceasefire, the monitoring of said ceasefire by a committee, an exchange of remains, prisoners and mine maps, the opening of roads, freedom of movement and movement of humanitarian aid as well as the reparation of electricity going into Sanaa.

Agreement document

YE_160417_Ceasefire in Marib between Hadi and Ansar Allah Forces_EN.pdf (opens in new tab) | Download PDF

Agreement document (original language)

YE_160417_Ceasefire in Marib between Hadi and Ansar Allah Forces_AR.pdf (opens in new tab)| Download PDF

Local agreement properties

Process type

Formal structured process

Rationale

This follows similar formality procedures to the other ceasefires in the Dhahran al-Janub sub-set (signed 10/04/16) involving regional representation and two stages of implementation. It seems there may be more formality in the sense that the nationally affiliated committee summons the provincial committee in this instance. Similar practices around content apply again; this involves ensuring safe spaces and access, the exchange of information about and physical remains of the dead, the opening of roads and the facilitation of aid access/work.

Is there a documented link to a national peace process?

Yes

Link to national process: articulated rationale

There is a reference in the text to the original national agreement made on 10/04/2016, while it does not explicitly reference this as the national process the agreement name is indicative, thus it is not directly quoted here but is considered a link. Further there is reason to select 'Yes' to link to the national as there is clear involvement of local governance groups with a clear stance towards the wider conflict and these can also be considered as state representatives. In all of these ceasefire agreements in the set, the language around the use of 'committee' tends to be fluid; with the committees holding a substantial level of responsibility in terms of implementation and monitoring but with some substantial differences regarding their make up. In most cases there is mention of the governorate level committee being involved. Importantly there is a provision in the national agreement text which outlines the implementation of a De-escalation and Coordination Committee, which is to work in coordination with local committees around the beginning of de-escalation. This committee is not always referenced, in this agreement however it may be, as the text refers to a committee summoning the Marib Committee. This would be a more explicit involvement of the nationally formed committees, however equally it is possible that some of the language of 'committee' across the local ceasefire texts is also referring to the involvement of the national committee.

Name of Locale

Marib governorate

Nature of Locale

Region

GPS Lat/Long (DD)

15.470199, 45.322797

Participant type

Central state actor
Local armed group

Mediator, facilitator or similar

Mediator or similar referred to

Mediator (references)

In contrast to some of the other ceasefire agreements in this set relating to the national agreement - (10/04/2016 Dhahran al-Janoub Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Yemen for Shabwah, al-Dhali’, al-Baydah, al-Jawf, Ma’rib, Ta’iz and Terms and Conditions) reference in the agreement text for this agreement seems more explicitly clear as it describes the Marib committee being summoned by another local committee to hold discussions.

Type of mediator/facilitator/similar

Regional state actor

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)

Page 1, Untitled preamble, Praise be to Allah, who said: “O you who have believed, enter into Islam completely and do not follow the footsteps of Satan. Indeed, he is to you a clear enemy.”1 Peace and blessings be upon His Noble Messenger, who said: “I am a Merciful God.” (1 Surah al-Baqarah 2:208)

Grievance List

[Summary] (1) demilitarisation of armed presences in the areas addressed by the agreement (2) secure the rights and safety of travellers on the roads and stop any detention of travellers (3) repair and re-open roads and ensure that relief can arrive via roads (4) the groups concerned must be allowed to repair power lines between Marib and Sana'a

Cattle rustling/banditry

No specific mention.

Social cover

No specific mention.