

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Country/entity | Yemen |
| Region | Middle East and North Africa |
| Agreement name | Agreement document between the disputed parties in Bani Al-Amiriya, Bikal Chamber, Mazhar District |
| Date | 7 Aug 2014 |
| Agreement status | Multiparty signed/agreed |
| Interim arrangement | Yes |

Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 -)

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

Stage Framework/substantive - partial

Conflict nature Inter-group

Peace process Yemen Inter-group Agreements

Parties Bikal Chamber
Houthis
Governor
Director of Security
Popular Committees
[7 other parties]

Third parties -

Description Agreement sponsored by state actors to attain calm in Mazhir District by (1) prohibiting inflammatory language; (2) ending armed manifestations at the mosque and elsewhere; (3) freedom of expression; (4) asserting the right of the state to solve disputes; (5) the nature of higher national principles including the results of the national dialogue conference.

Agreement document [YE_140807_Agreement document between the disputed parties in Bani Al-Amiriya, Bikal Chamber, Mazhar District_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

Agreement document (original language) [YE_140807_Agreement document between the disputed parties in Bani Al-Amiriya, Bikal Chamber, Mazhar District_AR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

Local agreement properties

Process type Formal structured process

Rationale This is an unusual type of local agreement, nonetheless it displays some level of formal process and support from local bodies dedicated to ensuring the provisions of the agreement. The body consists of the parties involved in the dispute which appear to be Ansar Allah (the Houthis) and Reformists (Al Islah party), and they are further supported by the Governor and Director of Security. There are also elements of persistent local practices of signing present, primarily by the expression of values involving peaceful co-existence among parties and freedom of opinion and expression. Similarly to other agreements between local groups and Ansar Allah, it appears that the process set out for implementation is generally ambiguous, with signing parties expected to display a level of mutual understanding and commitment around implementation.

Is there a documented link to a national peace process? T

Link to national process: articulated rationale The involvement of the Governor of the province cannot usually be assumed to represent a link to the national process. There are however direct references to the national process and to respect for state authority and law in the agreement which is signed by the Governor. The provisions of the agreement also stipulate that the state will be the ultimate authority in settling disputes and references principles of the national process as being of fundamental importance. It is implicit by the wording that these principles should be viewed as greater than any person or 'anyone'. Page 1, 4. Any disputes or mistakes by a person or persons, the State is the authority [to solve the issue] and no one has the right to avenge or influence, promote and follow the State jurisdiction according to law and order. Page 1, 5. National 'fundamental principles (Republic, unity, constitution, law and the outputs of the national dialogue). These principals cannot be compromised, accused, exited or possessed by anyone [if so] the authorities shall take proper legal measurements.

Name of Locale Mazhar district, Raymah (Rima) governorate

Nature of Locale Region

GPS Lat/Long (DD) 14.523218, 43.769699

Participant type Local state actor
Local armed group

Mediator, facilitator or similar Mediator or similar referred to

Mediator (references) Not listed in the agreement text but mentioned in the Arabic source attached to the Arabic agreement document, is the role of the Governor acting as a facilitator by hosting the signing in his office.

Type of mediator/facilitator/similar

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture) Page 1, In the name of God, most Gracious, most Compassionate

Grievance List [Summary] (1) Hostile propaganda, particularly from the mosque in addition to armed manifestations at the same locations; (2) a silencing of freedom of thought, speech and religion and lack of peaceful co-existence; (3) a weakening of rule of law

Cattle rustling/ banditry No specific mention.

Social cover No specific mention.