Peace Agreement Access Tool PA-X https://pax.peaceagreements.org/

| Country/entity | Yemen |
|------------------------|--|
| Region | Middle East and North Africa |
| Agreement name | Agreement between Ansar Allah and the al-Shilali Tribe in al-Ridmah, Ibb |
| Date | 15 Jul 2014 |
| Agreement status | Multiparty signed/agreed |
| Interim arrangement | Yes |

Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 -)

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implement 姆金拉姆 Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, coasefire attempts continuously failed. A two ye

| Stage | Ceasefire/related |
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| Conflict nature | Inter-group |
| Peace process | Yemen Inter-group Agreements |
| Parties | Zayd Mohammed bin Yahya al-Dhari [On behalf of Ansar Allah] Sheikh Abd al-Wahid Hizam al-Shilali al-Du'am [On behalf of al-Shilali Tribes] |
| Third parties | Sheikh Ahmed Salah al-Muqbali [Mediator] |
| Description | Agreement on an end to hostilities between the al-Shilali Tribes and Ansar Allah in al- Ridmah, and enforcement mechanism of payments, made to start 'this Muharram' (which is the beginning of the first month in the new calandar, which has been given as the date). |
| Agreement document | YE_140715_Agreement between Ansar Allah and the al-Shilali Tribe in Ibb_EN.pdf (opens in new tab) Download PDF |
| Agreement document (original language) | YE_140715_Peace Agreement between Houthis and Tribal Militias in Ibb_AR.pdf.pdf (opens in new tab) |

Local agreement properties

Process type Formal structured process

Rationale The locally accepted practice of sheikhs and societal notables calling parties to an agreement is present. There is nuance to this regarding the level of religious involvement, in that that sheikhs and notables from al-Ridmah are calling on representatives, one of which is also a sheikh. This adds a dual-level of religious commitment. There also appears to be a substantive presence of tribal values and process type to this agreement, as it appears implicit that one of the tribes of the area involved in fighting is affiliated with Ansar Allah (Houthis). While the Houthis are named as one of the parties, it appears implicit in the text that this agreement is fundamentally about tribal dynamics in the area and by extension the wider tribal network in the area will ensure the agreement is implemented. The duration of reconciliation is also set out in the text as six months, this longer term type of process being ascribed to an agreement appears to be a common tribal practice around this time. There is also reference to a previous agreement/reconciliation which might add to the procedural support involved in this agreement. Further, the text outlines a fines based enforcement mechanism supporting the agreement which is recognised by the tribes in the area.

Is there a T documented link to a national peace process?

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| GPS Lat/Long (DD) 14.227527, 44.585525 | |
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| Darticinant type local armod group | |
| raiticipant type Local anneu group | |
| Mediator, facilitator Mediator or similar referred to or similar | |
| MediatorSheikh Ahmed Salah al-Muqbali(references) | |
| Type of mediator/ facilitator/similar | |
| Local issues | |
| Ritual/prayer and Page 1, In the name of God, most process (including | Gracious, most Compassionate |
| use of scripture) Page 1, This is what has been agr | eed. May God be pleased with this. |
| - | lict generally in the area and the need for all public and re; bringing in or harbouring anyone prohibited into the |
| Cattle rustling/No specific mention.banditry | |
| Social cover Page 1, Paragraph 1, It also pro accepting anybody who [illegible | hibits both sides from using, bringing, harbouring or] the District. |