

**Country/entity** Yemen

**Region** Middle East and North Africa

**Agreement name** al-Baydah Ceasefire

**Date** 20 Apr 2016

**Agreement status** Multiparty signed/agreed

**Interim arrangement** Yes

### **Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )**

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

<b>Stage</b>	Ceasefire/related
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Inter-group
<b>Peace process</b>	Yemen peace process
<b>Parties</b>	17 Signatories:
<b>Third parties</b>	-
<b>Description</b>	Implementation agreement for the Dharan al-Janoub Ceasefire for al-Baydah outlining three steps (1) implementation of initial ceasefire; (2) form detainee release committees and secure delivery of aid; (3) hold regular meetings to implement the agreement.

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**Agreement document** [YE\\_160420\\_al-Baydah Ceasefire\\_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

**Agreement document (original language)** [YE\\_160420\\_al-Baydah Ceasefire\\_AR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

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### Local agreement properties

**Process type** Formal structured process

**Rationale** Similarly to the other ceasefires connected to the Dhahran al-Janoub national agreement signed in Saudi Arabia (10/04/16), this agreement continues the formal practice of a meeting held by a governorate authority in the form of a committee. Similarly to other agreements there are also representatives of the two parties involved. There is perhaps a slight increase in the level of formality to this agreement with three stages being described in the text provisions, where other local ceasefires have involved two or fewer stages. Similarly there are also provisions set out to encourage monitoring and implementation. In terms of content the themes are similar to other locales in this set: freeing up space and access generally, and also for medical aid access, exchange of information regarding prisoners, citizens being immune to any form of involvement in areas that are either neutral or connected to the two parties.

**Is there a documented link to a national peace process?** Yes

**Link to national process: articulated rationale** There is a reference in the text to the original national agreement made on 10/04/2016, while it does not explicitly reference this as the national process the agreement name is indicative, thus it is not directly quoted here but is considered a link. A link to the national process is also selected based on clear involvement of local governance groups with a clear stance towards the wider conflict and these can also be considered as state representatives. For all of these local ceasefire agreements in the sub-set, there is a provision in the national text which outlines the implementation of a De-escalation and Coordination Committee, which would consist of military and official government individuals with the aim of coordinating with local committees to encourage implementation. It is possible that to some degree this presence is always involved across these agreements in some way, whilst not always explicitly mentioned in the texts.

**Name of Locale** al Bayda governorate

**Nature of Locale** Region

**GPS Lat/Long (DD)** 13.987262, 45.580620

**Participant type** Central state actor  
Local armed group

**Mediator, facilitator or similar** Mediator or similar referred to

**Mediator (references)** In contrast to some of the other ceasefire agreements within this set relating to the national agreement -(10/04/2016 Dhahran al-Janoub Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Yemen for Shabwah, al-Dhali', al-Baydah, al-Jawf, Ma'rib, Ta'iz and Terms and Conditions) reference in the agreement text for this agreement seems more explicitly clear as it describes the al-Bayda Committee as holding a meeting between representatives of the two parties.

**Type of mediator/facilitator/similar** Regional state actor

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## Local issues

<b>Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)</b>	<p>Page 1, In the name of God, most Gracious, most Compassionate</p> <p>Page 1, Praise be to Allah, who says: "O you who have believed, enter into Islam completely [and perfectly] and do not follow the footsteps of Satan. Indeed, he is to you a clear enemy." Prayer and peace upon our master Muhammad and his family.</p> <p>Page 2, This is what was agreed upon. May God be reconciled.</p>
<b>Grievance List</b>	[Summary] (1) demilitarisation of armed presences in all fighting fronts (2) Prisoner release; arrest of citizen based on affiliation
<b>Cattle rustling/ banditry</b>	No specific mention.
<b>Social cover</b>	No specific mention.

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