

**Peace Agreement Access Tool PA-X** <https://pax.peaceagreements.org/>

<b>Country/ entity</b>	Syria
<b>Region</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>Agreement name</b>	Babulin Checkpoint Agreement between Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS) and the Ahrar al-Sham (AAS), Idlib Countryside
<b>Date</b>	27 Nov 2018
<b>Agreement status</b>	Multiparty signed/agreed
<b>Interim arrangement</b>	Yes
<b>Agreement/ conflict level</b>	Intrastate/local conflict ( Syrian Conflicts (1948 - ) (1976 - 2005) (2011 - ) )
<b>Stage</b>	Pre-negotiation/process
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Inter-group
<b>Peace process</b>	Syrian Local Agreements
<b>Parties</b>	Hayat Tahrir Al Sham Represented by: Abu Yasser Al Raubish [Signed] Syrian Liberation Front Represented by: Waleed Salman [Signed]
<b>Third parties</b>	Guarantor: Al Sham Legion Represented by: Abu Shadi Habash [Signed]
<b>Description</b>	Four-point Agreement seeking to solve the issue of the Babulin Checkpoint by providing for (1) affirmation of checkpoint control by Ahrar al-Sham; (2) that violations were committed by Ahrar al-Sham; (3) that the committee decided that checkpoint control by that group be removed for 60 days; (4) that no group may set up a checkpoint on the Main Haysh Fork. The agreement further confirms the members of the committee tasked with solving the problem.

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**Agreement document** [SY\\_181127\\_Babulin Checkpoint Agreement, Idlib Countryside\\_EN.pdf](#)  | [Download PDF](#)

## Local agreement properties

**Process type** Informal but persistent process

**Rationale** -> Local issues only; no external support mechanism; culture of signing There is no formally established mechanism to support the negotiation between Salafi armed groups. Moreover, this agreement cannot be linked to the national peace process. Indeed, both groups have a Salafist ideology; they oppose the rule of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and reject the idea of a national negotiation to solve the conflict. Yet, it seems that both signing parties (especially Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) choose to solve daily pragmatic issues related to their armed struggle through agreements. Although one cannot speak of a “culture” of signing peace agreements, the parties are involved (in a non-proactive and non-conscious way) in a persistent practice of signing local agreements. The agreement is related to multiple local level processes in Idlib governorate in 2018.

**Is there a documented link to a national peace process?** No

**Link to national process: articulated rationale** No link to the national peace process in Syria is mentioned in the agreement, neither it can be inferred from further research. First, the agreement does not involve local governance actors; and the signing parties themselves are not official state representative. Second, all parties to the agreement reject the national peace process, as it would maintain Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government in power. Finally, the agreement should be understood in the context of an “intra-religious insurgent groups” conflict where several factions that all oppose Bashar al-Assad engaged in fighting and took some distance from their initial raison d’être in the context of the Syrian civil war.

**Name of Locale** Babulin Checkpoint

**Nature Of Locale** Smaller

**GPS Lat/Long (DD)** 35.540119, 36.660143

**Participant type** Local armed group

<b>Mediator, facilitator or similar</b>	Mediator or similar referred to
<b>Mediator (references)</b>	Committee made up of locals (they are nominated as Khalid Saloum, Ahmad Ismael, Khalil Al Abdullah, Saleh Al Saloum and Khalid Al Faris)
<b>Type of mediator/facilitator/similar</b>	Local community/civilian group(s)/civil society organisations

## Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)	<p>Page 1, In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful</p> <p>Page 1, All praises be to Allah, the Lord of the worlds, and peace and blessings be upon our Prophet, Muhammad, and his family and companions.</p>
Grievance List	<p>Although the agreement does not refer to specific causes of the conflict, it lists three provisions to address local grievances.</p> <p>Page 1, The committee has decided the following:  First: It has been proven that the control of the checkpoint belongs to the Syrian Liberation Front (Jabhat Tahrir Suriyya).  [...]  Third: The committee has decided to remove this checkpoint in coordination with the command of the group during a period of 60 days (two months).  Fourth: No group has the right to establish any checkpoint on the Main Haysh Fork, no matter who they are.</p>
Cattle rustling/banditry	No specific mention.
Social cover	No specific mention.