

Peace Agreement Access Tool PA-X <https://pax.peaceagreements.org/>

Country/ entity	Syria
Region	Middle East and North Africa
Agreement name	Agreement between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Nour al-Din al-Zenki, Aleppo Countryside
Date	16 Nov 2017
Agreement status	Multiparty signed/agreed
Interim arrangement	Yes
Agreement/ conflict level	Intrastate/local conflict (Syrian Conflicts (1948 -) (1976 - 2005) (2011 -))
Stage	Ceasefire/related
Conflict nature	Inter-group
Peace process	Syrian Local Agreements
Parties	Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham [signed] The Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement [signed]
Third parties	Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Ahrar [role unspecified] Mediators: "Sheikh [illegible] and Sheikh Muslih Mohammed al-Uliya"
Description	5-point agreement providing for a ceasefire, opening of roads, removal of checkpoints, release of prisoners, formation of joint committee to work on unresolved issues; an end to media hostilities; and to form an operations room against the Syrian government.

Agreement document [SY_171116_Agreement between HTS and Nour al-Din al-Zenki, Aleppo countryside_EN.pdf](#) | [Download PDF](#)

Agreement document (original language) [SY_171116_Agreement between HTS and Nour al-Din al-Zenki, Aleppo countryside_AR.pdf](#) | [Download PDF](#)

Local agreement properties

Process type	Informal but persistent process
Rationale	-> Local issues only; no external support mechanism; culture of signing There is no formally established mechanism to support the negotiation between Salafi armed groups. Moreover, this agreement cannot be linked to the national peace process. Indeed, both groups have a Salafist ideology; they oppose the rule of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and reject the idea of a national negotiation to solve the conflict. Yet, it seems that both signing parties choose to solve daily pragmatic issues related to their armed struggle through agreements. Although one cannot speak of a “culture” of signing peace agreements, the parties are involved (in a non-proactive and non-conscious way) in a persistent practice of signing local agreements. The agreement is related to multiple local level processes in Aleppo governorate in 2017.
Is there a documented link to a national peace process?	No
Link to national process: articulated rationale	No link to the national peace process in Syria is mentioned in the agreement, neither it can be inferred from further research. First, the agreement does not involve local governance actors; and the signing parties themselves are not official state representative. Second, all parties to the agreement reject the national peace process, as it would maintain Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government in power. The agreement stipulates that a joint chamber of operation should be formed to topple the Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Finally, the agreement should be understood in the context of an “intra-religious insurgent groups” conflict where several factions that all oppose Bashar al-Assad engaged in fighting and took some distance from their initial raison d’être in the context of the Syrian civil war.
Name of Locale	Aleppo Countryside
Nature Of Locale	Region
GPS Lat/ Long (DD)	36.140399, 36.872665
Participant type	Local armed group
Mediator, facilitator or similar	Mediator or similar referred to

Mediator (references) Sheikh [illegible] and Sheikh Muslih Mohammed al-Uliya'
Type of mediator/facilitator/similar Domestic religious organisation/leader or other elder

Local issues

Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture) Page 1, Praise be to God who said: "Believers are but brothers" and peace and blessings be upon the Messenger of Allah who said: "Muslims are brothers" his family and companions... but now:
Page 1, 4. Stop all forms of media distortion by the Mujahidin and it is obligatory to call for [illegible] and to spread the spirit of the brothers of faith and religion among them all.

Grievance List Although the agreement does not refer to specific causes of the conflict, it lists five provisions to address local grievances.

Page 1,
1. Ceasefire, no rallies, removing checkpoints and opening the road.
2. The release of the prisoners from all sides immediately.
3. The formation of a joint committee of the parties [on the] all the unresolved issues and work on the return of things to what it was before the conflict.
4. Stop all forms of media distortion by the Mujahidin and it is obligatory to call for [illegible] and to spread the spirit of the brothers of faith and religion among them all.
5. To strive to form a joint chamber of operations against the criminal regime and its allies.

Cattle rustling/banditry No specific mention.

Social cover No specific mention.
