

|                                 |  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| <b>Country/entity</b>           | Mali   |
| <b>Region</b>                   | Africa (excl MENA)   |
| <b>Agreement name</b>           | Peace agreement between the Dogon and Fulani communities of Koro |
| <b>Date</b>                     | 28 Aug 2018  |
| <b>Agreement status</b>         | Multiparty signed/agreed   |
| <b>Interim arrangement</b>      | Yes  |
| <b>Agreement/conflict level</b> | Intrastate/local conflict  |

**Mali: Dogon-Fulani and other local conflicts (2015 -)**

An initially intercommunal conflict between Dogon and Fulani (known in Mali as Peulh) communities in the Mopti region in central Mali, which has strong regional and national dimensions as well. The conflict emerged in 2015 from disputes over access to natural resources and land management between traditionally sedentary agriculturalists, the Dogon community, and semi-nomadic pastoralists and traders, the Fulani community. Given the state's failure in providing security, various communities, including the Dozo community, grouped into militias, with the umbrella group Dan Na Ambassagou (DNA) comprising Dogon local defence militias. The intercommunal violence that ensued quickly became a regional emergency crisis, as extremist groups emerging from the northern regions to gain a foothold in the region benefited from this security vacuum by reinforcing the conflict through recruiting local population. In turn, the threat of extremist attacks fed back into the establishment of local defence militias. The emergence of Malian extremists in the Mopti region has triggered the internationalization of the conflict witnessing the intervention of international security forces, main missions being a Joint Force by the G5 Sahel, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the French Operation Serval (SOV). Given Mali's colonial historical relationship with France, these interventions have de facto further added to the complexities of this conflict's drivers. Reconciliation efforts on both local and state level culminated in a ceasefire agreement in 2018. However, in the run up to the July 2018 elections the region saw an upsurge in violent clashes with civilians by communal militias, with increasing violent activities by Dozo militias. In 2019 there was a sharp increase of violent attacks by militias, militaries and extremists, with violence against civilians being most common.

Close

Mali: Dogon-Fulani and other local conflicts (2015 -)

|                        |                                       |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <b>Stage</b>           | Framework/substantive - comprehensive |
| <b>Conflict nature</b> | Inter-group                           |
| <b>Peace process</b>   | Mali Local Processes                  |

|                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| <b>Parties</b>       | Signatures not present on copy, agreement states itself in preamble to be agreement of 'We, the Dagon and Fulani communities of Koro, hereinafter referred to as the Parties;'                       |
| <b>Third parties</b> | -  |
| <b>Description</b>   | Local peace agreement between Dogon and Fulani groups calling to stop inter-communal fighting and to 'reinvigorate traditional decision-making mechanisms' (p. 4) to manage natural resources usage. |

---

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Agreement document</b>                     | <a href="#">ML_180828_Accord de paix entre les communautés Dogon et Peule du cercle de Koro_tr.pdf (opens in new tab)</a>   <a href="#">Download PDF</a> |
| <b>Agreement document (original language)</b> | <a href="#">ML_180828_Accord de paix entre les communautés Dogon et Peule du cercle de Koro.pdf (opens in new tab)</a>                                   |

---

### Local agreement properties

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>Process type</b>  | Formal structured process  |
| <b>Rationale</b>   | This agreement was signed in the context of 'a three-month mediation process facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), mandated by the Malian government' (p.1) and is part of a series of local peace agreements mediated by HD in Mopti region (see, for example, 'Humanitarian agreement between Bambara and Bozo farmers, Fulani herders as well as hunters from the area ('circle') of Djenné' of 01/08/2019). The agreement also refers to 'previous reconciliation efforts by the State, through the Ministry of Reconciliation and the Mission to Support National Reconciliation, and by the Tabital Pulaku and Guina Dogon associations, as well as many local initiatives' (p.1). |
| <b>Is there a documented link to a national peace process?</b> | No   |
| <b>Link to national process: articulated rationale</b>         | The agreement was negotiated outside of the national-level peace process as it deals with conflict in central Mali. The parties to this agreement are not part of the national-level peace negotiation framework.  |
| <b>Name of Locale</b>  | Koro cercle  |
| <b>Nature of Locale</b>  | Region   |
| <b>GPS Lat/Long (DD)</b>                                       | 14.074502, -3.082684   |
| <b>Participant type</b>  | International or transnational actor<br>Domestic religious organisation/leader or other elder  |

**Mediator, facilitator or similar** Mediator or similar referred to or similar

**Mediator (references)** Mediator: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD)

**Type of mediator/facilitator/similar** International or transnational actor

---

## Local issues

**Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)** No specific mention.

**Grievance List** Page 2, Chapter I: Causes of Tension and Conflict between communities, The parties agree that inter-communal violence in the Koro area is the result of:

- Repeated attacks and looting of villages and hamlets by armed individuals;
- Assassinations of influential personalities;
- Large-scale robberies of cattle;
- Attacking markets;
- Embargos on certain villages, water points, weekly markets and the trade of certain products (cereals, milks);
- Absence of state authorities in most localities of the Koro area;
- Feeling on both sides that the neighbouring community is associated with armed groups to get revenge against the other community;
- Feeling of a lack of impartiality amongst certain elements of the authorities;
- Frustration due to unresolved or poorly resolved conflicts around access to natural resources.

**Cattle rustling/  
banditry**

Page 2, Chapter I: Causes of Tension and Conflict between communities,  
The parties agree that inter-communal violence in the Koro are is the result of:

...

- Large-scale robberies of cattle;

Pages 2/3, Chapter II: Clauses of the Peace Agreement, Section I: General Commitments  
of the Parties, Article 2

...

- Oppose theft / looting of livestock regardless of its owner;

Pages 3/4, Chapter II: Clauses of the Peace Agreement, Section II: Access to pastoral  
resources (water points, passage of animals, etc.), Article 3:

In addition to the efforts against theft and looting of cattle mentioned in Article 2 of this  
Agreement,

Recalling that the lack of water points and transhumance routes and the exclusion of  
certain communities from their access is one of the major causes of conflict in the Koro  
area,

The parties:

- Commit themselves fully to supporting all authorities in managing conflicts over access  
to natural resources;
- Recall that, to this end, it is essential to reinvigorate traditional decision-making  
mechanisms for the peaceful use of agro-pastoral resources.

**Social cover**

No specific mention.

---