

**Peace Agreement Access Tool PA-X** <https://pax.peaceagreements.org/>

<b>Country/ entity</b>	Syria
<b>Region</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>Agreement name</b>	Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement Agreement on Jabal Zawiyya
<b>Date</b>	26 Jul 2017
<b>Agreement status</b>	Multiparty signed/agreed
<b>Interim arrangement</b>	Yes
<b>Agreement/ conflict level</b>	Intrastate/local conflict ( Syrian Conflicts (1948 - ) (1976 - 2005) (2011 - ) )
<b>Stage</b>	Ceasefire/related
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Inter-group
<b>Peace process</b>	Syrian Local Agreements
<b>Parties</b>	Ahrar Al Sham Abu Al Saad [Signed]  Hayat Tahrir Al Sham Abu Obaidah Al Shami [Signed]
<b>Third parties</b>	-
<b>Description</b>	3-point agreement providing for a release of detainees; withdrawal of military forces, checkpoints and ending the state of alert; ending all media escalations.

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**Agreement document** [SY\\_170726\\_HTS and Ahrar al-Sham Agreement on Jabal Zaawiyya\\_EN.pdf](#)  | [Download PDF](#)

**Agreement document (original language)** [SY\\_170726\\_HTS and Ahrar al-Sham Agreement on Jabal Zaawiyya\\_AR.pdf](#) | [Download PDF](#)

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## Local agreement properties

**Process type** Informal but persistent process

**Rationale** -> Local issues only; no external support mechanism; culture of signing There is no formally established mechanism to support the negotiation between Salafi armed groups. Moreover, this agreement cannot be linked to the national peace process. Indeed, both groups have a Salafist ideology; they oppose the rule of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and reject the idea of a national negotiation to solve the conflict. Yet, it seems that both signing parties choose to solve daily pragmatic issues related to their armed struggle through agreements. Although one cannot speak of a “culture” of signing peace agreements, the parties are involved (in a non-proactive and non-conscious way) in a persistent practice of signing local agreements. The agreement is related to multiple local level processes in Idlib governorate in July 2017.

**Is there a documented link to a national peace process?** No

**Link to national process: articulated rationale** No link to the national peace process in Syria is mentioned in the agreement, neither it can be inferred from further research. First, the agreement does not involve local governance actors; and the signing parties themselves are not official state representative. Second, all parties to the agreement reject the national peace process, as it would maintain Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government in power. Yet, the agreement is related to multiple local level processes in and around Idlib in July 2017.

**Name of Locale** Jabal Zawiyya

**Nature Of Locale** Region

**GPS Lat/Long (DD)** 35.733345, 36.699925

**Participant type** Local armed group

**Mediator, facilitator or similar** No mention of mediator or similar

## Local issues

Ritual/ prayer and process (including use of scripture)	Page 1, In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful All praises be to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon his Prophet, his family, and all of his companions.  Page 1, We ask Allah to preserve the blood of the mujahideen and unite them.
Grievance List	Although the agreement does not refer to specific causes of the conflict, it lists three provisions to address grievances of the two fighting groups.  Page 1, 1. Releasing the detainees being held by both sides 2. Withdrawing all of the military forces, ending the state of alert, removing the barriers that were put up recently, and returning to the old barriers (Rawhi ah Fork, Radar, and Al Saleeb) 3. Stopping all of the escalation and incitement in the media
Cattle rustling/ banditry	No specific mention.
Social cover	No specific mention.

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