

**Country/entity** Yemen

**Region** Middle East and North Africa

**Agreement name** Agreement between al-Rabadi Resistance and Ansar Allah, Ibb Governorate

**Date** 15 Aug 2015

**Agreement status** Multiparty signed/agreed

**Interim arrangement** Yes

### **Yemeni Civil Wars (1994) (2011 - )**

The Republic of Yemen was formed in May 1990 after the merger between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. The unification process was rushed and the final agreement between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and President Ali Salem al-Beidh was based on the imperfect promise of equality. Following the merger, integration of the militaries and civil services was at best incomplete or at times entirely non-existent. When Saleh's General Congress Party (GPC) allied itself with the newly created Islamist Islah ('reform') party in 1993, the former ruling party of South Yemen – the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) – was effectively side-lined in the 1993 General Elections. Violence involving the use of heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment erupted in April 1994 and on the 21 May 1994 Vice President al-Beidh declared the secession of the south, citing political centralization with the northern highland tribes, violence against the YSP and economic discrimination. In the midst of fighting, negotiations in Cairo, Egypt, collapsed. The war ended with the military victory of the north, and on the 1 October 1994, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected President.

Despite the unification of Yemen in 1990, political power during the 1990s and 2000s remained centralized with the northern highland tribes, particularly the villages from which President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his confidants stemmed. The system of clientelism established through the ruling General People's Congress party maintained relative loyalty among the fractured political allegiances of Yemen's traditional tribal leadership. However, diminishing oil reserves and the shrinking opportunities for access to rent increased economic and political marginalization in Yemen's peripheral communities. The degree of regionalism of conflicts is further defined by other local grievances. In the northern governorate of Sa'dah, a backlash was provoked among the local Zaydi Shi'a against Sunni Salafist cultural incursions resulting in six wars between 2004 and 2010. In the southern governorates of Hadramawt, Shabwa, al-Dhali and Abyan, civil and military personnel forcibly retired after the 1994 Civil War began protesting and eventually formed the secessionist Southern 'al-Hiraak' movement in 2007. Furthermore, tribal grievances have spurred attacks on oil companies and government installations to extract rents. Various takfiri groups including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have also increased their presence since 1995.

The Yemen Spring in early 2011 allowed all these movements to express their joint displeasure. Moreover, factionalism in the regime split the already weak military and thus allowed the Houthis, the takfiris and tribal-based militia known as popular committees, to assert themselves militarily. Mandated by the UN-sponsored Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the National Dialogue held from March 2013 to January 2014 aimed at guaranteeing power-sharing among the different parties. However, the GCC Initiative only included formal political parties that did not accurately reflect political realities. Furthermore, provisions lacked adequate transitional justice and provided former-President Saleh, as well as others, full amnesty. As a result, little faith was placed in the process by formerly marginalized groups such as the Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) and al-Hiraak who opted to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the state by strengthening their own territorial enclaves. In September 2014 the Houthis succeeded in capturing the capital Sana'a and gradually expanded their control southward. The subsequent UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement between transitional president Hadi and the Houthis on a federal, democratic Yemeni state, failed to be implemented as the Houthis successfully dissolved the parliament and deposed Hadi in January 2015. Following the Saudi military intervention to restore the Hadi government in March 2015, ceasefire attempts continuously failed. A two-year

<b>Stage</b>	Ceasefire/related
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Inter-group
<b>Peace process</b>	Yemen Inter-group Agreements
<b>Parties</b>	This is what the first party, the representative of Ansar Allah, Capt. Ali bin Hasan Abd Allah [illegible] and the second party, to represent the people of al-Rabadi, Muhammad Qassim Lutf, Ahmad Ali Ahmad Aqil, [illegible], Sheikh Abd al-Hamid Qassim al-Qat'ah, Sheikh Ameen Muhammad Abdullah Hasan [illegible], Capt. Sadiq al-Salahi, have signed
<b>Third parties</b>	written by the mediator [illegible]
<b>Description</b>	Four-point agreement providing for (1) a withdrawal of fighters, an end to violence and incitement; (2) a clear slate in relation to past events; (3) that Ansar Allah will not pursue those that led actions towards them; and (4) a release of prisoners and exchange of dead. Each party is responsible for implementation.

**Agreement document** [YE\\_150815\\_al-Rabadi Agreement\\_EN.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

**Agreement document (original language)** [YE\\_150815\\_al-Rabadi Agreement\\_AR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

### Local agreement properties

**Process type** Informal but persistent process

**Rationale** This agreement appears to reflect some of the general common practices of mutual respect between local non state affiliated armed groups, particularly in reference to the exchanges of the dead and release of prisoners. Similar to other agreements, peace among brothers is referenced in this context and this is also relevant to the mutually understood practice that regarding the areas of conflict addressed by the agreement, there will be no retributive justice. This also tends to be present in these practices, whereby there is a level of guarantee from both sides that people identified as having either provided some form of support to fighters or been directly involved in fighting, either by area or by fighting group, should not be targeted following the agreement. Often information around the names of those involved in fighting and/or capture is referred to as having been recorded, so there may be substantial weight to these type of locally understood commitments. Similarly to other local agreements at this time, this is a fairly autonomously implemented agreement among the local parties involved.

**Is there a documented link to a national peace process?** No

**Link to national process: articulated rationale** Capt. Sadiq al-Salahi signed on behalf of the resistance - unknown affiliation with the State. Agreement is written on letterhead from Ministry of Justice, General Directorate for Documentation. The source indicates this as a tribal document and the name al Rabadi may indicate connection to army brigades as part of resistance to the Houthis but there is not enough clarity. This could equally be affiliation with a southern group. Therefore 'no' is chosen as additionally to this, it cannot be clearly ascertained that any of those involved in the signing are recognised as supportive or non-supportive of national institutions and equally cannot clearly be described as either local governance actors or state representatives.

**Name of Locale** al-Rabadi (sub-district) area in Jibala district south west of Ibb

**Nature of Locale** Smaller

**GPS Lat/Long (DD)** 13.924278, 44.145845

**Participant type** Local armed group

**Mediator, facilitator or similar** Mediator or similar referred to

**Mediator (references)** There is a mediator referred to and the text states that the agreement is written by the mediator. There is no name. There is mention in the supporting reference of a mediation committee which ensures the exit from the area of fighting groups and the protection of those who supported them and allowed them to use their homes. The responsibility for implementation in this agreement however is explicitly placed with the two parties.

**Type of mediator/facilitator/similar** Unclear/Other

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### Local issues

**Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)** Page 1, In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful  
Page 1, All praises be to Allah, and peace and blessings be upon His Prophet.

**Grievance List** [Summary] (1) clearing the slate; (2) that Ansar Allah does not pursue those that fought them; (3) prisoner release; (4) hand over of military vehicle by al-Rabadi resistance to Ansar Allah; (5) handover of deceased and injured.

**Cattle rustling/ banditry** No specific mention.

**Social cover** No specific mention.

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