

<b>Country/entity</b>	Mali
<b>Region</b>	Africa (excl MENA)
<b>Agreement name</b>	Peace Agreement between the Dogon & Peulh communities of Madougou and Barapirely
<b>Date</b>	24 Jan 2021
<b>Agreement status</b>	Multiparty signed/agreed
<b>Interim arrangement</b>	Yes
<b>Agreement/conflict level</b>	Intrastate/local conflict

**Mali: Dogon-Fulani and other local conflicts (2015 -)**

An initially intercommunal conflict between Dogon and Fulani (known in Mali as Peulh) communities in the Mopti region in central Mali, which has strong regional and national dimensions as well. The conflict emerged in 2015 from disputes over access to natural resources and land management between traditionally sedentary agriculturalists, the Dogon community, and semi-nomadic pastoralists and traders, the Fulani community. Given the state's failure in providing security, various communities, including the Dozo community, grouped into militias, with the umbrella group Dan Na Ambassagou (DNA) comprising Dogon local defence militias. The intercommunal violence that ensued quickly became a regional emergency crisis, as extremist groups emerging from the northern regions to gain a foothold in the region benefited from this security vacuum by reinforcing the conflict through recruiting local population. In turn, the threat of extremist attacks fed back into the establishment of local defence militias. The emergence of Malian extremists in the Mopti region has triggered the internationalization of the conflict witnessing the intervention of international security forces, main missions being a Joint Force by the G5 Sahel, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the French Operation Serval (SOV). Given Mali's colonial historical relationship with France, these interventions have de facto further added to the complexities of this conflict's drivers. Reconciliation efforts on both local and state level culminated in a ceasefire agreement in 2018. However, in the run up to the July 2018 elections the region saw an upsurge in violent clashes with civilians by communal militias, with increasing violent activities by Dozo militias. In 2019 there was a sharp increase of violent attacks by militias, militaries and extremists, with violence against civilians being most common.

Close

Mali: Dogon-Fulani and other local conflicts (2015 -)

<b>Stage</b>	Framework/substantive - partial
<b>Conflict nature</b>	Inter-group
<b>Peace process</b>	Mali Local Processes

**Parties**

For the Dogon community:  
Atoye Doumbo, head of village of Materou  
Mamoudou Perou, counsellor at Bande  
Moussa Goro, head of village of Madougou  
Hamidou Kodio, counsellor at Madougou  
Souleymane Kodio, representative of the head of village of Kassawan Da  
Yessa Goro, head of village of Domino Sogou  
Mohamed Kodio, head of village of Anana  
Issa Dougnon, head of village of Barapirely  
Issiaka Poudiogo, head of village of Ourokoun  
Timothee Dougnon, head of village of Anakanda  
Hamidou Dougnon, head of village of Nagadourou

For the Fulani community:  
Mamoudou Barry, head of village of Binedama  
Daouda Barry, head of village of Naye  
Hamidou Barry, head of village of Madougou Peulh  
Moussa Djoune Barry, head of village of Karakinde  
Aliou Kodjou Barry, counsellor at Naye  
Bangole Barry, counsellor at Madougou Peulh  
Aliou Hamadoun Barry, head of village of Bombou

**Third parties**

Witnesses  
First witness: Allaye Teme, first vice-president of Monobem  
Second witness: Saidou Dama, representative of Haut Conseil Islamique (High Islamic Council of Mali)  
Third witness: Nouh Djeme, first vice-president of Recotrade

[Unsigned: mediators from the HD Centre]

**Description**

This is one of three agreements signed between the Fulani and Dogon with humanitarian objectives on 12, 22 and 24 January 2021, led by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) and the community association Monobèm. Through these agreements, the communities further commit to ensuring the physical integrity and free circulation of persons, goods, and livestock, while condemning the violence in the circle of Koro, in Central Mali. In this agreement, the representatives of the local communities agree to facilitate circulation of people and goods, access to lands and roads, attendance of markets, and access to NGOs, while at the same time committing to not carrying weapons.

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**Agreement document** [ML\\_210124\\_Peace Agreement between the Dogon & Peulh communities of Madougou and Barapirely\\_tr.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#) | [Download PDF](#)

**Agreement document (original language)** [ML\\_210124\\_Peace Agreement between the Dogon & Peulh communities of Madougou and Barapirely\\_FR.pdf \(opens in new tab\)](#)

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## Local agreement properties

<b>Process type</b>	Formal structured process
<b>Rationale</b>	The negotiations were supported by the HD Centre who noted that "these agreements are part of the mediation framework implemented by HD – also known as the Henry Dunant Centre – as mandated by the Office of the Prime Minister of Mali and with the financial support of the Government of Canada."
<b>Is there a documented link to a national peace process?</b>	Yes
<b>Link to national process: articulated rationale</b>	The link to the national process is suggested by the involvement of the Office of the Prime Minister of Mali in mandating that the negotiation be undertaken.
<b>Name of Locale</b>	Koro Circle
<b>Nature of Locale</b>	Region
<b>GPS Lat/Long (DD)</b>	14.360047, -3.086573
<b>Participant type</b>	Local state actor Local armed group International or transnational actor Domestic religious organisation/leader or other elder Local community/civilian group(s)/civil society organisations
<b>Mediator, facilitator or similar</b>	Mediator or similar referred to
<b>Mediator (references)</b>	The HD Centre was instrumental in bringing the representatives of the villages together in talks. Further, their announcement of the signing notes that "These agreements are part of the mediation framework implemented by HD – also known as the Henry Dunant Centre – as mandated by the Office of the Prime Minister of Mali and with the financial support of the Government of Canada."
<b>Type of mediator/facilitator/similar</b>	Central state actor Local community/civilian group(s)/civil society organisations International or transnational actor

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## Local issues

**Ritual/prayer and process (including use of scripture)** No specific mention.

## Grievance List

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Recalling that in the past the Dogon and Peulh communities coexisted peacefully in the Koro Circle communes of Madougou and Barapirely, despite the tensions that have always existed between our communities concerning the management of resources natural that we share;

Aware that these tensions are exacerbated by the high level of insecurity throughout the Dogon plateau, Senno and Gondo and that the current conflict has led to the end of economic activities, mass killings in 2018, and even the restriction of the free movement of people and their goods;

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Chapter II: Causes and consequences of the conflict

Article 2: The Parties agree that the inter-communal conflict between them across their municipalities is the result of the following elements:

- a) Repeated attacks and looting of villages and hamlets by armed individuals;
- b) Targeted assassinations of influential figures;
- c) Massive cattle theft by both parties;
- d) Attacks and ambushes against market stalls;
- e) Embargoes on certain villages, water points, weekly markets, and the marketing of certain products (cereals, cattle, and milk),
- f) Closure of basic social services (schools, health center, distribution stores, etc.),
- g) Withdrawal of state agents and defense and security forces in all municipalities;
- h) The feeling on both sides that the neighboring community has joined forces with armed groups to attack the other;
- i) Lack of impartiality of the defense and security forces;
- j) Lack of justice after cases of extrajudicial abuses;
- k) Frustration due to unresolved or poorly resolved inter-communal conflicts on access to natural resources, etc.

Article 3: The Parties agree that the inter-communal conflict between them in their municipalities has had the following consequences since the end of 2017:

- a) The death of more than 350 people;
- b) The displacement of more than 4000 people from 2018 to 2020;
- c) The theft of 2500 heads of cattle;
- d) Embargos in the markets of Madougou, Karakindé, Dangatènè, etc. ;
- e) Restrictions on access to cultivable land in both municipalities;
- f) Restrictions on movement between communities in the two municipalities.

**Cattle rustling/  
banditry**

Page 3:

Article 3: The Parties agree that the inter-communal conflict between them in their municipalities has had the following consequences since the end of 2017:

[...]

c) The theft of 2500 heads of cattle;

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Chapter III: Commitments of the Parties

Article 4: The Parties jointly undertake to:

[...]

h) Oppose cattle theft regardless of the owner's community and facilitate the search for stolen goods and animals so that they can be returned to their owner;

i) Not claim animals and property removed or lost during the conflict ;

**Social cover**

No specific mention.