Agreement between the British and Irish Governments: Monitoring and Compliance

  • Country/entity

    Ireland
    United Kingdom
    Northern Ireland
  • Region

    Europe and Eurasia
    Europe and Eurasia
    Europe and Eurasia
  • Agreement name

    Agreement between the British and Irish Governments: Monitoring and Compliance
  • Date

    1 Apr 2003
  • Agreement status

    Multiparty signed/agreed
  • Interim arrangement

    Yes
  • Agreement/conflict level

    Interstate/intrastate conflict(s) ( Northern Ireland Conflict (1968 - 1998) )
  • Stage

    Implementation/renegotiation
  • Conflict nature

    Government/territory
  • Peace process

    Northern Ireland peace process
  • Parties

    UK government, Irish Government
  • Third parties

    -
  • Description

    Agreement between the British and Irish Governments for the establishment of a new body that will monitor and report on the carrying out of commitments relating to the ending of paramilitary activity and the programme of security normalisation, i.e. Independent Monitoring Commission.


Groups

  • Children/youth

    No specific mention.

  • Disabled persons

    No specific mention.

  • Elderly/age

    No specific mention.

  • Migrant workers

    No specific mention.

  • Racial/ethnic/national group

    No specific mention.

  • Religious groups

    No specific mention.

  • Indigenous people

    No specific mention.

  • Other groups

    No specific mention.

  • Refugees/displaced persons

    No specific mention.

  • Social class

    No specific mention.


Gender

  • Women, girls and gender

    No specific mention.

  • Men and boys

    No specific mention.

  • LGBTI

    No specific mention.

  • Family

    No specific mention.


State definition

  • Nature of state (general)

    No specific mention.

  • State configuration

    No specific mention.

  • Self determination

    No specific mention.

  • Referendum

    No specific mention.

  • State symbols

    No specific mention.

  • Independence/secession

    No specific mention.

  • Accession/unification

    No specific mention.

  • Border delimitation

    No specific mention.

  • Cross-border provision

    No specific mention.


Governance

  • Political institutions (new or reformed)

    No specific mention.

  • Elections

    No specific mention.

  • Electoral commission

    No specific mention.

  • Political parties reform

    No specific mention.

  • Civil society

    No specific mention.

  • Traditional/religious leaders

    No specific mention.

  • Public administration

    No specific mention.

  • Constitution

    No specific mention.


Power sharing

  • Political power sharing

    No specific mention.

  • Territorial power sharing

    No specific mention.

  • Economic power sharing

    No specific mention.

  • Military power sharing

    No specific mention.


Human rights and equality

  • Human rights/RoL general

    No specific mention.

  • Bill of rights/similar

    No specific mention.

  • Treaty incorporation

    No specific mention.

  • Civil and political rights

    No specific mention.

  • Socio-economic rights

    No specific mention.


Rights related issues

  • Citizenship

    No specific mention.

  • Democracy

    No specific mention.

  • Detention procedures

    No specific mention.

  • Media and communication

    No specific mention.

  • Mobility/access

    No specific mention.

  • Protection measures

    No specific mention.

  • Other

    No specific mention.


Rights institutions

  • NHRI

    No specific mention.

  • Regional or international human rights institutions

    No specific mention.


Justice sector reform

  • Criminal justice and emergency law
    Justice sector reform→Criminal justice and emergency law→Criminal Justice System reform
    Page 2-3, MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE, 3.
    The following procedures will apply. Any incidents of non-compliance by any party will, in the normal course of events, be subject to either political exposure or, where appropriate, the process of law. However, with a view to further enhancing public confidence, the Governments recognise that it will also be important to consider other appropriate responses to non-compliance in the light of any reports on breaches by the Independent Monitoring Body...The British Government would envisage amending the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to enable a variety of responses appropriate to the gravity of the breach in question, including motions of censure, the withholding of allowances, temporary suspension from participation in the Agreement’s institutions or, in the most serious cases, exclusion for varying periods, to be made.
  • State of emergency provisions

    No specific mention.

  • Judiciary and courts

    No specific mention.

  • Prisons and detention

    No specific mention.

  • Traditional Laws

    No specific mention.


Socio-economic reconstruction

  • Development or socio-economic reconstruction

    No specific mention.

  • National economic plan

    No specific mention.

  • Natural resources

    No specific mention.

  • International funds

    No specific mention.

  • Business

    No specific mention.

  • Taxation

    No specific mention.

  • Banks

    No specific mention.


Land, property and environment

  • Land reform/rights

    No specific mention.

  • Pastoralist/nomadism rights

    No specific mention.

  • Cultural heritage

    No specific mention.

  • Environment

    No specific mention.

  • Water or riparian rights or access

    No specific mention.


Security sector

  • Security Guarantees

    No specific mention.

  • Ceasefire

    No specific mention.

  • Police
    Page 4, ANNEX: TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY, 7.
    The Independent Monitoring Body would consult as required with the Policing Board, the Oversight Commissioner and the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning.
  • Armed forces
    Page 4, ANNEX: TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY, 2.
    In relation to the British Government’s commitments to a package of security normalisation measures, the Independent Monitoring Body would publish reports as to whether those measures were being fully implemented within the agreed timescales, in the light of its assessment of the paramilitary threat and the British Government’s obligation to ensure the safety and security of the community as a whole, including:
    • demolition of towers and observation posts;
    • withdrawal of troops from police stations;
    • closure and dismantling of military bases and installations;
    • troop deployments and withdrawals from Northern Ireland and levels of British Army helicopter use;
  • DDR
    Security sector→DDR→Demilitarisation provisions
    Page 4, ANNEX: TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY, 7.
    The Independent Monitoring Body would consult as required with the Policing Board, the Oversight Commissioner and the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning.
  • Intelligence services

    No specific mention.

  • Parastatal/rebel and opposition group forces
    Page 2, MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE, 2.
    A new independent body will therefore be created that will monitor and report on the carrying out of the commitments relating to the ending of paramilitary activity and the programme of security normalisation, as set out in paragraphs 12-19 and Annex 1 of the Joint Declaration. It will also have a more general responsibility to consider claims by any party in the Assembly that another party is fundamentally in breach of requirements in the Declaration of Support or elsewhere in the Agreement. The body will have four members, two appointed by the British Government (including one from Northern Ireland) and one each by the Irish and US Governments. It will carry out its activities with a view to promoting public confidence and ensuring that any serious noncompliance with these acts of completion is identified and reported. The terms of reference of this independent body are outlined in the attached annex.

    Page 4, ANNEX: TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY, 1.
    In relation to the remaining threat from paramilitary groups the Independent
    Monitoring Body would publish its findings on:
    • any continuing paramilitary involvement in attacks on the security forces, murders, sectarian attacks, involvement in riots, and other criminal offences;
    • any continuing involvement of paramilitary groups in training, targeting, intelligence gathering, acquisition or development of arms or weapons and other preparations for terrorist campaigns;
    • the extent to which any paramilitary groups still appear to be engaged in punishment beatings/attacks and exiling;
    • their assessment of whether the leaderships of such organisations are directing such incidents or seeking to prevent them; and
    • trends in security incidents.
  • Withdrawal of foreign forces

    No specific mention.

  • Corruption

    No specific mention.

  • Crime/organised crime

    No specific mention.

  • Drugs

    No specific mention.

  • Terrorism
    Page 4, ANNEX, TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY, 1.
    In relation to the remaining threat from paramilitary groups the Independent Monitoring Body would publish its findings on:
    ... • any continuing involvement of paramilitary groups in training, targeting, intelligence gathering, acquisition or development of arms or weapons and other preparations for terrorist campaigns;

    Page 4, ANNEX, TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY, 2.
    In relation to the British Government’s commitments to a package of security normalisation measures, the Independent Monitoring Body would publish reports as to whether those measures were being fully implemented within the agreed timescales, in the light of its assessment of the paramilitary threat and the British Government’s obligation to ensure the safety and security of the community as a whole, including:
    ... • the repeal of counter-terrorist legislation particular to Northern Ireland.

Transitional justice

  • Transitional justice general

    No specific mention.

  • Amnesty/pardon

    No specific mention.

  • Courts

    No specific mention.

  • Mechanism

    No specific mention.

  • Prisoner release

    No specific mention.

  • Vetting

    No specific mention.

  • Victims

    No specific mention.

  • Missing persons

    No specific mention.

  • Reparations

    No specific mention.

  • Reconciliation

    No specific mention.


Implementation

  • UN signatory

    No specific mention.

  • Other international signatory

    No specific mention.

  • Referendum for agreement

    No specific mention.

  • International mission/force/similar

    No specific mention.

  • Enforcement mechanism
    Page 2-3, MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE, 3.
    The following procedures will apply. Any incidents of non-compliance by any party will, in the normal course of events, be subject to either political exposure or, where appropriate, the process of law. However, with a view to further enhancing public confidence, the Governments recognise that it will also be important to consider other appropriate responses to non-compliance in the light of any reports on breaches by the Independent Monitoring Body. In this connection, the Governments propose that if the Independent Monitoring Body concluded, following its own inquiries, that there were good reasons to believe that a party or individual member of the Assembly was in breach, it would report its findings to the two Governments, making clear what action needed to be taken to remedy the breach and what measures, if any, it would be appropriate to apply. The Governments would initiate discussions in the Implementation Group to consider the action to be taken in response to the report. If the Implementation Group recommended that a motion be put before the Assembly, the Secretary of State would give notice requiring the motion to be moved. Any motion put before the Assembly following the tabling of a report would be subject to decision on a cross-community basis. Where such a motion failed to attract cross-community support, or where the Implementation Group had failed to agree a course of action, it would be a matter for the British Government, in consultation with the Irish Government and the parties, to resolve the matter in a manner consistent with the report of the Independent Monitoring Body. The British Government would envisage amending the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to enable a variety of responses appropriate to the gravity of the breach in question, including motions of censure, the withholding of allowances, temporary suspension from participation in the Agreement’s institutions or, in the most serious cases, exclusion for varying periods, to be made.

    Page 4, ANNEX, TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY, 3.
    At the request of the Governments, the Independent Monitoring Body may be asked to consider claims by any party in the Assembly that another party is in breach of requirements in the Declaration of Support or elsewhere in the Agreement.
  • Related cases

    No specific mention.

  • Source
    Irish DFA

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS:

MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE

APRIL 2003

1. On account of the divisive legacies of the past and the deficit of mutual confidence between both communities, we now judge it necessary to build various safeguards and assurance mechanisms into the proposals set out in the Joint Declaration.

These do not reflect a lack of confidence by the two Governments in the willingness of the various parties to meet their commitments.

However, it is our judgement that, without such mechanisms, it will be impossible to generate the confidence which is required all round if we are to achieve the necessary outcomes.

We accept that some parties will not be able to endorse these proposals, but the two Governments believe that they are

essential to secure the future of the Agreement.

2. A new independent body will therefore be created that will monitor and report on the carrying out of the commitments relating to the ending of paramilitary activity and the programme of security normalisation, as set out in paragraphs 12-19 and Annex 1 of the Joint Declaration.

It will also have a more general responsibility to consider claims by any party in the Assembly that another party is fundamentally in breach of requirements in the Declaration of Support or elsewhere in the Agreement.

The body will have four members, two appointed by the British Government (including one from Northern Ireland) and one each by the Irish and US Governments.

It will carry out its activities with a view to promoting public confidence and ensuring that any serious noncompliance with these acts of completion is identified and reported.

The terms

of reference of this independent body are outlined in the attached annex.

3. The following procedures will apply.

Any incidents of non-compliance by any party will, in the normal course of events, be subject to either political exposure or, where appropriate, the process of law.

However, with a view to further enhancing public confidence, the Governments recognise that it will also be important to consider other appropriate responses to non-compliance in the light of any reports on breaches by the Independent Monitoring Body.

In this connection, the Governments propose that if the Independent Monitoring Body concluded, following its own inquiries, that there were good reasons to believe that a party or individual member of the Assembly was in breach, it would report its findings to the two Governments, making clear what action needed to be taken to remedy the breach and what measures, if any, it would be

appropriate to apply.

The Governments would initiate discussions in the Implementation Group to consider the action to be taken in response to the report.

If the Implementation Group recommended that a motion be put before the Assembly, the Secretary of State would give notice requiring the motion to be moved.

Any motion put before the Assembly following the tabling of a report would be subject to decision on a cross-community basis.

Where such a motion failed to attract cross-community support, or where the Implementation Group had failed to agree a course of action, it would be a matter for the British Government, in consultation with the Irish Government and the parties, to

resolve the matter in a manner consistent with the report of the Independent Monitoring Body.

The British Government would envisage amending the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to enable a variety of responses appropriate to the gravity of the breach in question, including motions of censure, the withholding of allowances, temporary suspension from participation in the Agreement’s institutions or, in the most serious cases, exclusion for varying periods, to be made.

ANNEX

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING BODY

1. In relation to the remaining threat from paramilitary groups the Independent Monitoring Body would publish its findings on:

• any continuing paramilitary involvement in attacks on the security forces, murders, sectarian attacks, involvement in riots, and other criminal offences;

• any continuing involvement of paramilitary groups in training, targeting, intelligence gathering, acquisition or development of arms or weapons and other preparations for terrorist campaigns;

• the extent to which any paramilitary groups still appear to be engaged in

punishment beatings/attacks and exiling;

• their assessment of whether the leaderships of such organisations are directing such incidents or seeking to prevent them;

and

• trends in security incidents.

2. In relation to the British Government’s commitments to a package of security normalisation measures, the Independent Monitoring Body would publish reports as to whether those measures were being fully implemented within the agreed timescales, in the light of its assessment of the paramilitary threat and the British Government’s obligation to ensure the safety and security of the community as a whole, including:

• demolition of towers and observation posts;

• withdrawal of troops from police stations;

• closure and dismantling of military bases and installations;

• troop deployments and withdrawals from Northern Ireland and levels of British Army helicopter use;

• the repeal of counter-terrorist legislation particular to Northern Ireland.

3. At the request of the Governments, the Independent Monitoring Body may be asked to consider claims by any party in the Assembly that another party is in breach of requirements in the Declaration of Support or elsewhere in the Agreement.

4. The Independent Monitoring Body would report to the two Governments, making recommendations as to appropriate remedies for particular breaches and what measures, if any, it would be appropriate to apply.

5. The Independent Monitoring Body would have access to all the information necessary to carry out its functions, subject to appropriate conditions to ensure confidentiality.

6. The Independent Monitoring Body would be expected to publish reports as and when required and, in any event, at least every six months.

7. The Independent Monitoring Body would consult as required with the Policing Board, the Oversight Commissioner and the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning.